# EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS
# OF VACCINATION GAMES

José Martins[1,2]* and Alberto Pinto[1,3]

[1]LIAAD-INESC TEC, R Dr Roberto Frias, 4200-465 Porto, Portugal

[2]School of Technology and Management, Polytechnic Institute of Leiria,
Campus 2, Morro do Lena Alto do Vieiro, 2411-901 Leiria, Portugal

[3]Faculty of Sciences, University of Porto, R Campo Alegre, 4169-007 Porto, Portugal

jmmartins@ipleiria.pt (*corresponding author), aapinto@fc.up.pt

In this work, we consider a vaccination game where people choose between to vaccinate or not to vaccinate, depending on the perceived morbidity risks from the vaccine and from the infection. We introduce the evolutionary vaccination dynamics for the reinfection SIRI model and we prove that it is bistable. The bistability of the evolutionary dynamics indicates that the damage provoked by false scares on the vaccination perceived morbidity risks can be much higher and much more persistent than in the SIR model.